DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
BOARD FOR CORRECTION OF MILITARY RECORDS
Application for the Correction of
the Coast Guard Record of:
BCMR Docket No. 2008-174
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
FINAL DECISION
This is a proceeding under the provisions of section 1552 of title 10 and section 425 of
title 14 of the United States Code. The Chair docketed the case on August 1, 2008, upon receipt
of the completed application, and assigned it to staff member J. Andrews to prepare the decision
for the Board as required by 33 C.F.R. § 52.61(c).
appointed members who were designated to serve as the Board in this case.
This final decision, dated April 30, 2009, is approved and signed by the three duly
APPLICANT’S REQUEST
The applicant asked the Board to correct her record by removing a special officer evalua-
tion report (SOER)1 covering her service from February 1 to October 15, 2006, as the Operations
Officer of a high-endurance cutter. On or about October 15, 2006, she was dropped off in Singa-
pore to return stateside, having been removed from her position on the cutter, which had recently
completed joint exercises with the Navy and was headed to the Middle East. The SOER contains
low marks in most of the performance categories,2 negative comments, and a mark in the second
spot on the comparison scale.3 The applicant also asked the Board to expunge any other docu-
ments that refer to her removal as the Operations Officer or to the SOER and to correct the
reporting date on the SOER. In this regard, she noted that while she reported to the cutter on
March 31, 2006, the SOER erroneously indicates that she reported on March 6, 2006, which was
the date her transfer orders were issued.
1 UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, COMDTINST M1000.6A, PERSONNEL MANUAL, Art. 10.A.3.c.1.a. (Change
39, Mar. 8, 2005) (hereinafter “PERSMAN”) (stating that an SOER may “document performance notably different
from the previous reporting period, if deferring the report of performance until the next regular report would
preclude documentation to support adequate personnel management decisions, such as selection or reassignment.”).
2 Coast Guard officers are rated in numerous categories of performance on a scale of 1 to 7, with 7 being best. A
middle mark of 4 is the “expected standard of performance.” PERSMAN, Art. 10.A.4.c.4.g.
3 There are 7 possible marks on the comparison scale ranging from “performance unsatisfactory for grade or billet”
to “BEST OFFICER of this grade.” A mark in the second spot denotes a “marginal performer; limited potential.”
The OER form instructs the Reporting Officer to complete the comparison scale by comparing the Reported-on
Officer with all of the other officers of the same grade whom the Reporting Officer has known throughout his career.
UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, Form CG-5310B, OFFICER EVALUATION REPORT (OER) (June 2005).
SUMMARY OF THE APPLICANT’S MILITARY RECORD
On May 22, 2002, the applicant was commissioned an ensign upon graduating from the
U.S. Coast Guard Academy. For two years, she was assigned to serve as a deck watch officer
aboard a high endurance cutter, serving on watch import and underway; navigating the ship; and
serving as the Assistant Combat Information Center (CIC) Officer and Training Officer, among
other collateral duties. She received very good marks on her OERs and was strongly recom-
mended for promotion. She was promoted to lieutenant junior grade on November 22, 2003.
From June 21, 2004, to January 31, 2006, the applicant served as the Executive Officer of
a patrol boat, where she was responsible for the management, administration, and operation of
the boat and for enforcement of policies. She received excellent marks on her OERs in this posi-
tion and was highly recommended for promotion.
On March 31, 2006, the applicant reported aboard the XXXX, a high endurance cutter
with a crew of 180. She was immediately sent ashore for 100 days of Navy training as a Tactical
Action Officer (TAO). While in TAO training, she was promoted to lieutenant on May 22, 2006.
Upon her return to the cutter in June 2006, the applicant assumed her duties as the new Opera-
tions Officer. A new Commanding Officer (CO) also reported aboard in June 2006. The disput-
ed SOER in this case documents her service on the cutter through October 16, 2006, when she
was removed from her position, and it was prepared by the Executive Officer (XO) and CO, who
served on the applicant’s rating chain4 as the Supervisor and Reporting Officer, respectively.
Because the SOER documents the applicant’s removal from her primary duty, it is a “derogatory
report” under Article 10.A.4.h.1. of the Personnel Manual.
The numerical marks and comments in the disputed SOER appear in the table below.
According to block 2 of the SOER, the applicant’s duties as head of the Operations Department
on the cutter were the following:
Responsible for plng, coord & execution of unit missions of ship of 180 crewmembers incl[uding]
[Search and Rescue], [Law Enforcement], Military ops & flight ops. Resp[onsible] for op reports
& unit preparedness for joint operations w/ DOD forces for Middle East deployment. Supervises 3
[junior officers], 3 [chief petty officers], 23 [petty officers]. Budget $115K/yr. Senior Deck
Watch Off[icer] (DWO), Tactical Action Off[icer] (TAO), Command Security Off[icer] (CSO),
Nav[igation] & Seamanship Trng Team (NSTT) Leader. OER submitted [in accordance with] Art.
10.A.3.c.1.a., due to performance reflecting serious deficiencies in leadership, technical skills &
inability to effectively carry out assigned duties. Per Article 10.A.4.h.1., this OER is a Derogatory
Report. Removed from primary duty 15 OCT 06.
4 Officers are evaluated by a “rating chain,” which normally includes a Supervisor, who is normally the person to
whom the Reported-on Officer reports on a daily basis and who completes the first 13 numerical marks in an OER
and their supporting comments; a Reporting Officer, who is normally the Supervisor’s Supervisor and who com-
pletes the remaining marks and comments in an OER; and the Reviewer, who is normally the Reporting Officer’s
Supervisor, who reviews the OER for consistency, and who need not have observed the Reported-on Officer’s
performance. PERSMAN, Arts. 10.A.2.a., 10.A.2.d.1.a., 10.A.2.e.1.a., and 10.A.2.f.1.a.
MARKS AND COMMENTS IN THE DISPUTED SOER
# CATEGORY
3a Planning and
Preparedness
3b Using Resources
3c Results/
Effectiveness
3d Adaptability
3e Professional
Competence
4a Speaking and
Listening
4b Writing
5a Looking Out for
Others
5b Developing
Others
5c Directing Others
5d Teamwork
5e Workplace
Climate
5f Evaluations
MARK WRITTEN COMMENTS
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
2
2
4
5
Often caught unprepared for ops w/ Navy Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG)
units during u/w exercises; failed to prep for scheduled ops; daily ops briefs
weak despite specific tasking provided in writing & verbal feedback provided on
numerous occasions. Failed to adjust priorities to that of command. Insistent
that staff prepare for equator crossing ceremony but seemed unconcerned
about readiness posture in CIC [Combat Information Center] or DOD exercise
event schedule. Intelligent officer; spent long hours researching issues. Failed
to use expertise of staff; delegation sometimes done with no apparent follow up
& loss of awareness of project status, chart/trackline updates for deployment,
mngmt of comms/RADIO. Subordinates sometimes left wondering what to do
while ROO was overwhelmed with work. Taskers often not relayed to resp.
parties resulting in missed deadlines; Ex: improvements to nav brief, daily ops
brief, status of flight deck cert. Sometimes missed helpful comments from
ESG staff; missed opportunity to provide input to strait transit plan could have
impacted negatively on CG & XXXX except noticed by CO & corrected by staff
working through the night. Good shiphandler in most conditions. Moored ship
safely; coached young JO during heavy [weather] at sea. Difficulty performing
under pressure; once appeared to freeze during simulated missile drill as TAO,
very confused during port breakout drill with ESG. Subordinates voiced lack of
confidence to command.
Comments to officers/chiefs gatherings & at quarters sometimes inappropri-
ately loud for audience, reducing effectiveness of message. Sometimes gave
long, drawn out responses to relatively easy questions re speed req’d for next
leg of transit, expected time for flight ops, etc. Inability to speak in concise,
clear terms degraded confidence of audience. Good writer. Sometimes wrote
too much info where short responses would have been more appropriate;
lengthy email responses to short questions made it difficult to understand key
points requiring additional follow up.
Argued for relaxing ODU uniform on watch & for command to pay increased
attention to details of equator crossing ceremony. Did not always use strong
skill sets in CIC watchstanders, some with several yrs Navy experience could
have been employed better to assist with DOD ops. Continued aggressive
PQS program for CIC watchstanders, resulting in additional qualified pers,
critical during extended deployment. Somewhat detached from long-term
plans for development of pers in Comms Div & Bridge Div. Ineffective as
senior officer in CIC despite prior experience as CIC watchstander; extensive
formal training, numerous exercises, & tutelage from peers/command. Rarely
asked for help except during crisis when requests for help eroded confidence
of subordinate watchstanders. Ex: Lack of oversight of CG aircraft under XXXX
control. CIC team failure during simulated missile attack; port breakout
ex[ercise]. Failed to establish positive relationships w/ Div officers/Chiefs or
other dept heads. Sometimes ordered others to provide needed info rather
than partnering to develop common sense of purpose. Ex: Inputs for daily situ-
ation reports/ briefs, integrated training team planning, logistic requests, ESG
ops skeds. Supported COMDT workplace policies. Enlisted evals on time w/
appropriate justification. Completed O2 Officer evals; very well written & on
time.
Signature of the Executive Officer of the cutter as Supervisor, dated October 22, 2006
6
7 Reporting
Officer’s
Comments
NA
[Concur.] Performance during this abbreviated period can be described as
unfocussed, ineffective & extremely tentative. Appears overwhelmed by fast
moving preparations for Out of Hemisphere deployment. Since deployment
began has been struggling at nearly every juncture. Organization, prioritization
and follow-up virtually non-existent. Informal counseling on several occasions
by command cadre failed to make a difference in performance. Has failed to
channel energies into a viable leadership style. Subordinates have expressed
doubt to command about ability to lead.
Marginal initiative [with respect to] CENTCOM deployment ops. Specific direc-
8a
Initiative
2
Judgment
8b
8c Responsibility
8d Professional
Presence
8e Health & Well-
Being
2
2
3
3
9 Comparison Scale
2
10 Potential
NA
tion & close follow up required on several deployment issues, hesitant to con-
duct critical liaison or provide timely input to counterparts on other ESG units.
Requires detailed direction & command follow-up for nearly all reports. Accept-
ed gratis navigational product from Boeing Corp. representative after being told
to wait for guidance by command, calling into question judgment. As naviga-
tor, failed to properly supervise navigational preps for Philippine Strait transit,
missing a critical track leg & using wrong scale charts, resulted in ship transit-
ing in proximity to shoal, direct command intervention required. As TAO, failed
to properly supervise ADC [air direction controller] during flight operations,
resulting in unit HH65 crossing into air space of 3 different ESG units; seeming
oblivious to consequences, command intervention required to relieve ADC.
Has stated confusion about role as senior leader aboard cutter, giving distinct
impression of uneasiness with critical responsibilities of Dept Head. Hesitant &
inarticulate under pressure during combat exercises. Difficulties building
strong professional relationships with Dept Head peers. Appears in good
health and meets all COMDT Standards.
[A mark in the second spot denotes that the officer is a “Marginal performer;
limited potential.”]
This officer has limited potential to successfully perform present responsibili-
ties. I have lost confidence in ability to lead the operations department during
a very dynamic and challenging CENTCOM deployment. I am relieving this
officer of responsibilities of the Operations Officer, Navigator and Tactical
Action Officer. I do believe this officer has the capacity to serve successfully in
other operational assignments in the future, and should be given the opportu-
nity to gain professional experience necessary to handle challenging fast
paced assignments. Assignment ashore to a Command Centre or similar
position is recommended.
11 Signature of the CO of the cutter as the Reporting Officer, dated October 22, 2006
12 Signature of the Chief of Area Cutter Forces Management as the Reviewer, dated December 5, 2006
Applicant’s Addendum
Because the SOER was a “derogatory report,” the applicant was permitted to submit an
addendum,5 in which she alleged that many of the problems she encountered on the cutter were
due to incomplete staffing and untrained personnel. She reported aboard two weeks before the
start of “workups” with the Navy in preparation for their deployment, and the Operations Depart-
ment “had a long way to go” to adapt from standard operating procedures (SOP) for a Coast
Guard patrol board to Navy SOP. The Combat Information Center Officer (CICO) did not arrive
on board until September and was unfamiliar with Navy SOP; the lead OSC in the CIC had no
experience with radar and went on leave during the workups; the one CIC watchstander with
prior Navy experience lacked a security clearance and could not enter the CIC; and a new BMC
navigator arrived during the final week of the workups. Until her last two weeks on board, her
only experienced junior officer was serving as both the CICO and the Assistant Navigator. In
addition, communicating about schedules for drills, etc., with the Navy was very difficult as
many of her queries via email and telephone calls went unanswered.
5 A “derogatory report” includes any OER that “[d]ocuments adverse performance or conduct that results in the
removal of a member from his or her primary duty or position.” PERSMAN, Art. 10.A.4.h.1.c. Submitting an
addendum to a derogatory report “provides the Reported-on Officer an opportunity to explain the failure or provide
their views of the performance in question.” Id. at Art. 10.A.4.h.2. The Supervisor and Reporting Officer may
prepare written comments concerning matters address in the addendum, and these comments are also attached to the
OER and the addendum. The Reviewer “shall ensure that the evaluation of the Reported-on Officer is consistent and
that the derogatory information is substantiated. If the Reviewer finds otherwise, he or she shall return the report to
the Reporting Officer for additional information and/or clarifying comments.” Id.
The applicant wrote that because of repairs and renovations, the cutter had been underway
for only 45 days during the prior year, so even many of the continuing crewmembers had little
underway experience. Despite these problems, her department worked very hard to learn Navy
SOP and to train those who had little or no underway experience. Furthermore, as the TAO, she
was standing 1 in 3 watches6 and overseeing drills one or two more hours each day, and eight to
ten more hours during the workups.
Regarding the flight deck certification, she wrote that as soon as she noticed that it had
not been received, she initiated emails and telephone calls to no effect until she sent an official
message, which received a quick response, and she forwarded it to the XO.
Regarding the equator crossing ceremony, the applicant wrote that the comments in the
SOER exaggerate her interest in the matter. She simply mentioned the ceremony to the Morale
Officer and the Command Master Chief a few days before the crossing and “mentioned it in pass-
ing a few other times but … never got involved in planning it beyond speaking to the [Engineer-
ing Officer] about it for a few minutes once he had taken over the project.” Regarding her
request that the watchstanders be allowed to forgo wearing the standard ODU (Officer of the Day
Uniform) shirt while on watch, she did so at the request of several subordinates after the weather
got extremely hot when they entered the tropics because she knew that the ODU requirement had
been relaxed on other patrols. When her request was denied, she “did nothing more than ensure
that the uniform was enforced.”
Regarding her conduct during quarters (department meetings), she stated that she was
never told that she was speaking too loud and that the meetings were held near the hangar, where
it was difficult for them to hear each other over the noise of the engines and ventilation system.
In addition, she stated that she only gave longer explanations when she believed they were
needed, such as when there were variables that could affect whatever was under discussion.
The applicant denied being confused during the port breakout drill, and noted that “it was
difficult to maintain an accurate picture of what was going on since I was in CIC and it was pri-
marily a small boat attack drill run from the bridge. We discussed lessons learned for CIC after-
wards and took it as a learning experience as none of us had done anything like that before.”
Regarding their exercises with the Navy, the applicant wrote that their difficulties
were compounded by the difference in Navy and Coast Guard combat capabilities. While a Navy
TAO is stationed in front of computer screens and mainly listens to the recommendations from
other warfare areas and authorizes their suggestions for use of force, this is not possible to the
same degree on a 378’ [Coast Guard cutter]. For example, a Navy TAO does not listen in on voice
comm[unication]s with the Helo, but instead takes status updates from the ADC [air direction con-
troller]. This is what I was doing in the situation mentioned in the [SOER] comments. The differ-
ence between TAO School training and real life meant that I was learning how the Command
6 A “1 in 3” watch means that the member performs two 4-hour watches each day, with 8 hours between the end of
one watch and the beginning of the next, on one of three schedules: Midnight to 4:00 a.m. and noon to 4:00 p.m.
(known as the “mid watch”); 4:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.; and 8:00 a.m. to noon; and 8:00 p.m.
to midnight. UNITED STATES COAST GUARD RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CENTER, Report No. CG-D-13-
01, U.S. COAST GUARD GUIDE TO THE MANAGEMENT OF CREW ENDURANCE RISK FACTORS, 3.4.5.1. (Sept.
2001), available at .
wanted it run during the exercises and was compounded by the fact that neither my Chief (when he
was there) or any 1st class PO [petty officer] had ever done a traditional RD [radar] job before. It
is very difficult to act as senior leadership while trying to train the PO’s and Chief on how to
acquire tracks, make voice reports or direct a helo, as TAO School by no means makes one an RD
or ADC or teaches one how to train RD’s on the finer points of their jobs. I was only able to
ensure that there was a robust training program, which I am credited for in the OER comments.
The applicant alleged that the comment about the CIC failure during a simulated missile
attack is absolutely wrong. She explained that during the simulated attacks, they received reports
of incoming missiles from aircraft and avoided all of these. However, a while later, they
received a chat message saying “Missile inbound to XXXX,” with no bearing, range, or physical
representation provided. After her request for such information received no response, she
initiated a response based upon the direction of the last threat they had received. She then
received a chat message saying that they had shot down only one of two incoming missiles and
so were out of the exercise for the next three hours. The XXXX was one of the last vessels to
take a “hit” in this way, and when she later asked the Navy trainers what they had done wrong,
she was told that the cutter was “hit” because it had been decided that every vessel was going to
be hit at least once during the exercise. She explained this to the CO and thought that he had
understood and accepted the explanation.
Regarding the “navigational product” from Boeing, the applicant alleged that prior to the
cutter’s deployment, she was told that “we were going ahead with the Boeing project.” She later
learned “that there was confusion between two simultaneous Boeing projects” being led by the
same people, but she did not know this at the time. Because of this confusion, a Boeing program
was loaded onto a stand-alone computer on the cutter for less than one day, and it was never used
because she deleted the program ten minutes after learning that it was a different Boeing project
that had been approved. The applicant wrote that she explained what had happened to the XO
and CO, and they seemed satisfied with how she had fixed the problem and did not criticize her
“judgment,” although the incident was used in the SOER to justify a mark of 2 in that category.
The applicant alleged that she did not have a negative relationship with any department
head, division officer, or division chief, but worked 18+ hour days her entire time aboard the cut-
ter and so had “very little time to discuss anything at length. I certainly did whatever I could to
provide them with whatever they needed from me.” She also denied feeling any uneasiness or
confusion about her role as the Operations Officer and head of the Operations Department. She
stated that she loved working aboard cutters and had hoped to make a career afloat. She was
“100% dedicated to the mission and the crew and was willing to put in any amount of work
necessary to ensure we succeeded.” However, although her subordinates were dedicated, they
“had not been trained in how to deploy with the Navy.” Her counterpart on a Navy ship consist-
ed of three people—a LCDR Operations Officer, a LT Assistant Operations Officer, and a LTJG
Navigator—and they had numerous junior officers, chiefs, and petty officers “who had done the
mission before and were not required to follow CG operational policies concurrent with the Navy
ones.” Her position was “quite possibly the most difficult position in the Coast Guard and [she
was] expected to ensure we could out-perform a strike group of newer ships with better trained
crews and far superior weapons and technology.” The applicant stated that she did not know
until about ten days before she was removed from the cutter that the difficulties her department
encountered as they mastered Navy standards and policies were being counted as black marks
against her despite “the numerous times we were commended by the ESG on a job well done.”
Rating Chain’s Endorsements of the Applicant’s Addendum
The XO forwarded the applicant’s addendum without written comment. The CO wrote
that the training and staffing short-falls on the XXXX “are similar for most cutters during the
summer transfer season. While these factors may have been accentuated by lack of underway
time the previous year, allowances were made for this in my appraisal of [the applicant’s] overall
performance and opportunity was given to show progress towards managing the workforce and
other responsibilities.”
The Reviewer forwarded the addendum stating that he had carefully reviewed it and
“found no evidence of inconsistencies, and that the derogatory information is substantiated.” He
concurred with the CO’s description of the applicant’s future potential. He stated that the
“dynamic and challenging Strike Group workups and subsequent CENTCOM deployment were
an obvious mismatch with this officer’s current abilities and expertise. However, I do feel this
officer has the capacity to grow and gain the necessary operational seasoning and experience that
would again make her competitive for future assignments.”
Following her removal from the XXXX, the applicant was assigned to serve as a Com-
mand Duty Officer, standing watch in a District command center, where she supervised and
allocated resources for the District’s operations. She has received excellent marks on her OERs
in this position and strong recommendations for promotion.
APPLICANT’S ALLEGATIONS
The applicant alleged that the SOER is “filled with exaggerations, prejudice and outright
fallacies.” The applicant stated that she reported to the XXXX on March 31, 2006, while still an
LTJG. Two days later she was sent off the cutter for eleven weeks of training at the Navy’s
Tactical Action Officer School. She returned to the ship on June 19, 2006, after having been
promoted to LT, and she assumed the position of Operations Officer on June 23, 2006, when the
prior Operations Officer departed. The CO took command on June 30, 2006, and on July 5,
2006, the XXXX “got underway from Seattle to conduct two months of extensive, arduous
training with our Navy Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) in the San Diego area.”
Upon assuming the duties of Operations Officer, she learned that two-thirds of the crew
had transferred, so there were “very few personnel qualified to stand watches for a Coast Guard
patrol, let alone successfully participate in a Navy ESG.” In addition, her department had almost
no experienced senior enlisted personnel to fill the key positions. For example, because of the
recent merger of the quartermaster and boatswain’s mate ratings, there were “no prior Quarter-
masters in the Navigation Division” who could safely navigate a large cutter, and the Chief for
that division did not arrive on the cutter until after the ESG exercises were completed. Likewise,
the Radarman rating had been merged with the Telecommunications rating to form the Opera-
tions Specialist (OS) rating, and none of the OS crew were prior RDs. Moreover, when merging
the two ratings, “the Coast Guard had cut out the portions of the RD training that applied to Navy
operations and would be vital to the assigned mission.” Therefore, her two most important divi-
sions—Navigation and the Combat Information Center (CIC)—“were being led by chief petty
officers who had spent their entire careers in other mission areas and had been given little or no
training for the jobs in which they were looked to as experts.”
The applicant stated that because of these staffing and training gaps, during the “workup”
exercises with the Navy that began in mid July, her department had no Navigation Chief, an
inexperienced CIC Chief, one moderately experienced OCS ensign trying to manage both the
Navigation and CIC Divisions, and one brand-new Academy ensign learning the ropes with the
Radio Division.” In addition, they had very few qualified CIC or bridge watch standers of any
rank or rate. Therefore, she urged everyone into a robust training program to try to close the gaps
and “hoped that the Command would understand the difficulties we faced as well as our efforts
to overcome them.”
The applicant alleged that the command climate created by the new CO, however, made
her very difficult situation almost unbearable. Because she believes her own claims in this regard
might sound simply vengeful because of the SOER, she has submitted four statements from other
crewmates, which are summarized below. She noted that her allegations about the CO’s attitude
and conduct are also supported by the fact that he was relieved of command of the XXXX for
striking an enlisted watchstander a few months after her departure.
The applicant stated that at first the CO seemed “tough but fair” and, when she explained
the staffing problems her department faced, he seemed to understand and was “determined to get
us up to speed” prior to reaching the Middle East. However, once they began working with the
Navy, he became increasingly “angry, irrational, belittling, and even physically violent.” She
first encountered his anger on July 16, 2006, during one of their first exercises with the Navy.
She was in the CIC but was not acting as the TAO; instead, she was an observer, taking notes on
areas for improvement. The Navy ships were much better equipped for the exercise: The Navy
cruisers could detect aircraft up to 300 miles away, whereas the XXXX’s detection range was
just 100 miles; the Navy cruisers could shoot aircraft down with advanced missile systems, but
the XXXX had only a “main gun”; and the Navy cruiser had an “advanced tracking system,”
while the XXXX had a very old system that lost connectivity frequently. Therefore, during the
exercise, the Warfare Area Commander was not selecting the XXXX to participate in shooting
any of the targets, which enraged the CO “who began to belittle me and the enlisted personnel in
CIC, as though [our] failures were due merely to a lack of effort or interest.” When she tried to
explain to the CO that their difficulties were due to training and equipment,
he turned his fury on me … he grabbed me by the upper arm and pulled me to the center of CIC.
Standing just inches away from me, towering over me, and still holding tightly to my arm, he pro-
ceeded to berate and humiliate me in front of my own Department. He told me that I had better
look around, because my lack of effort would get them all killed in the Persian Gulf, etc. I saw the
crew looking at us, but I felt completely powerless and unable to speak. In that instant, my trust in
his leadership was shattered, just as I feared he had shattered my personnel’s trust in mine. Just as
quickly as he had come in, the CO let go of my arm, turned on his heel, and left CIC.
Later the XO offered to speak to the CO on her behalf, but she asked him not to because
she feared retribution from the CO. In retrospect, she realizes that she should have taken her
complaint outside of the command, but at the time she rationalized the CO’s actions as “simply
passionate” and she wanted to “avoid the complications inherent in making that type of accusa-
tion.” However, the applicant alleged, the
incident in CIC pretty much set the tone for the deployment, and just about everyone in the Depart-
ment came to fear the CO’s rage. On multiple occasions, for example, he slammed phone receiv-
ers down hard enough to break them, and would berate personnel for equipment failures and situa-
tions beyond their immediate power to prevent. On more than one occasion, he threw things at us
or towards us, including an incident during a morning brief with most of the officers and chiefs
present. He grabbed my pen from me and threw it as hard as he could at my Nalgene water bottle,
which was about 2 feet away from him and right next to me. It bounced off and hit me in the chest,
just as he stormed out of CIC. I provide these examples not as an indictment of the CO, but
instead to paint a picture of the Command Climate that we all had to deal with onboard XXXX.
The applicant stated that her difficulties as the Operations Officer were compounded by
the fact that she had to stand watches due to the lack of qualified watchstanders, whereas Opera-
tions Officers do not usually stand watches, and she had to stand 8 hours of TAO watch every
day. The applicant described her days on the XXXX as follows:
Just as I would come off my morning [4:00 to 8:00 a.m.] watch, the day’s events would begin, and
I would have to return to CIC to take over as Primary TAO, where I would remain until my eve-
ning [4:00 to 8:00 p.m.] watch began. Since the XO insisted that I still attend evening reports and
I had to be awake first thing in the morning for the Operations Brief, the only watch that I could
stand was the 4-8’s, meaning that I was on watch during the Exercises from 0330 until 1930, with
only a few short breaks for meals. It was only after watch and evening reports that I was able to
start in on the massive task of acting as Operations Officer for a major cutter—normally a full-time
job. To try and keep up, I would work until one or two in the morning, then try to get a few hours
of sleep before getting back up for watch at three. The rotation was grueling and exhausting, but
made immeasurably worse by the Command’s refusal to act as though I had any less time in the
day for my normal duties as would a regular Coast Guard Operations Officer on a Coast Guard
patrol. I was expected to do too much, but when I tried to explain this to the XO, he told me that I
had better just get used to it. My requests to make changes within my own Department—such as
by moving my division officers around to reassign the XO’s Administrative Assistant, an Academy
ensign with one year’s experience, to the Navigation Division while I awaited qualified relief—
were frequently taken by the XO as personal attacks against his leadership & decision-making
instead of simply attempts on my part to streamline and overcome our manning challenges. From
the time of the incident in CIC onward, I felt almost as though the Command were pushing me
toward failure, as though they wanted me to fail and were just looking for ways to justify it.
The applicant stated that the XO made it very clear from the beginning that he was
unwilling to confront the CO or even tell him the truth. During a fueling at sea evolution, the
XO was supervising an ensign serving as the “conning officer for speed,” while the applicant
supervised the “conning officer for course.” She had warned the XO that the “conning officer for
speed” had no experience. During the evolution, the cutter went too fast and got too far forward
because the XO waited too long to tell the ensign to slow the vessel. The CO “exploded in rage”
and asked the XO who was at fault. The XO blamed the ensign, and the CO screamed at the
ensign and made her leave the bridge. Therefore, she planned to allow the ensign to be a conning
officer during their approach to Singapore a few days later to help the ensign regain her confi-
dence. However, when she discussed the matter with the XO, he said that the CO would not let
the ensign drive the ship again and it was clear to her that the XO would never confront the CO
on behalf of his subordinates.
As another example of the XO’s alleged attitude, the applicant stated that each day she
prepared an Operational Summary for the command. The XO often rewrote entire paragraphs
before handing it to the CO. “On multiple occasions, the CO would berate me for the wording of
paragraphs that the XO had actually written himself, but the XO would simply shake his head
disapprovingly at me, as though he had not been the author.” The applicant chose to remain
silent rather than “rat out” the XO, but felt even further alienated from the command.
The applicant alleged that both the XO and the CO “refused to be pleased or satisfied
with anything [she] did.” At one meeting, she reported that her calculations showed it would
take seven full days, from noon on September 16 to noon on September 23, 2006, to transit from
Seattle to Hawaii. However, the CO insisted that that was eight full days and that they should be
able to make it in seven. Other department heads spoke up and agreed with her that it was seven
days, rather than eight, but the CO “berated and belittled me in front of them all as he continued
to incorrectly count the dates on his fingers by including the 16th and the 23rd, with only 12 hours
of transit time each, as 2 full days. He later told me that I was either lazy or stupid, and tried to
force me to pick one.” Therefore, she sent an email to the XO with the details of her calcula-
tions, and the XO responded that she had insulted him and wasted his time by providing so many
details “when a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ on whether or not we could make it to Hawaii early would
suffice. … This is but one example of the situation I faced each day—whether concerning transit
times, weapons capabilities, the quality of the intelligence summaries sent to us by Pacific Area
or the excess or lack of information contained in the daily Operations Brief.”
The applicant alleged that aside from belittling her in public, the CO and XO only for-
mally counseled her once before she was removed from her position. During the counseling ses-
sion, which occurred on the way from Hawaii to Singapore, the CO said that she needed to
“improve” but that he was not considering removing her. He told her that she “needed to be
more involved in the details of my Department” and better friends with the other department
heads, but did not give her much specific direction. He suggested that she chat with the other
department heads at breakfast, but she was still standing watches at breakfast time. Later, the
XO told her to delegate more and take more “personal time” to be happier, but that advice
contradicted the CO’s. The applicant stated that she had already asked for certain jobs to be reas-
signed within her department so that she would not have to stand so many watches, and her
requests had been refused and so her hands were tied but they “criticized [her] for not being able
to juggle all that was handed to [her].”
Two days after the counseling session, the CO volunteered her for “two huge additional
responsibilities. First, to create the Straits Transit Plan for our passage through the Philippine
Islands and second, to take over the immense task of acting as Surface Warfare Commander for
the remainder of our transit to Singapore.” Whereas the Navy cruisers had teams of personnel
trained to do these things, she was the only person in her department who had attended TAO
School and knew what these duties entailed, so she had to do it herself or train her “already
exhausted personnel in how to help” her. Moreover, she was not told that she was personally
responsible for the Straits Transit Plan until the night before the brief was due. On the cutter’s
last night in Singapore, the applicant alleged, the CO called her in and told her that she
had done a good job, but that he thought he could get someone better. He said that I would have
been successful had we been conducting a regular Coast Guard patrol. He told me that he didn’t
think that any of our TAO’s could successfully “fight the ship” in an attack, but that he believed
others could do better than I could. Most shocking was the CO’s declaration that he had decided 2
weeks after his arrival that I was simply not the OPS boss he wanted, and now he had a replace-
ment. … I later found that the Command had been lying to me for the previous weeks, and that
they had been making arrangements to replace me even before I was first counseled—that they had
contacted [another lieutenant] and asked him if he would replace me. Prior to my arrival at the
Command Center [that lieutenant] learned from several of his friends onboard what the Command
Climate was like, and withdrew his request to go. With this knowledge, the Command’s refusal to
be satisfied with any of my actions and their combination of counseling and additional responsi-
bilities seemed, in my mind, to fall into place.
Regarding the comment in the SOER that she was often caught unprepared, the applicant
stated that scheduling and communications with the Navy were very difficult, and that the CO or
XO would often “receive the answer [to her inquiries] unsolicited before [she] could get [an
answer] through efforts on [her] end.” Regarding the strait transit brief, the applicant alleged that
she did not prepare one because she had been expressly told that she was not expected to prepare
one, although the CO had asked the ESG for this responsibility. When the CO discovered an
email tasking them with the job late in the evening before the brief was due, he became enraged
when she told him that she had not prepared a transit brief. The XO later recommended that she
not try to explain it again to the CO “but instead to simply take the blame and move on.”
Regarding the allegedly weak “ops briefs,” the applicant alleged that the CO had unrea-
sonable expectations. He expected them to create their own intelligence slides even though they
had no Intelligence Team or information from the PACAREA. In another case, the CO asked
them to “list all upcoming message requirements,” and the XO berated them for not including the
message requirements of other departments, such as logistics, engineering, and weapons. When
they produced detailed slides with this information the next day, the XO accused her of mocking
him by providing too much information. But when they removed those slides from the presenta-
tion, the CO was angry they had done so. The applicant stated that the CO required very detailed
morning briefs, and his desires constantly changed, so that it seemed “they were determined to
find fault with our efforts and, in particular, me.”
The applicant denied that her subordinates were ever left “wondering what to do.”
Regarding her allegedly unrelayed “taskers,” she stated that the XO and CO would daily give her
a to-do list while she was “on watch in CIC and unable to locate many of my subordinates to pass
these ‘taskers’.” They would often ask her if the tasks had been completed before she had had a
chance to ensure that they were. Regarding the flight deck certification, the applicant alleged that
she was “not responsible for this until there was a problem.”
Regarding the comment that she had frozen during a simulated missile drill, the applicant
alleged that she froze because the CO had grabbed her by the arm, not because of what was hap-
pening in the drill. In addition, the applicant alleged that the comment about her becoming “very
confused” during a drill is twisted and taken out of context. She alleged that this port breakout
drill was a simulated small boat attack run from the bridge by the CO and the XO and that the
person who was charged with reporting what was happening to the CIC, where she was located,
failed to report properly. Therefore, during the brief afterward, she reported that because of the
lack of information about the attack being passed to the CIC from the bridge, she and others in
the CIC were “very confused about what was going on.” She reported this problem so that they
could develop “a better system for passing information, not to express any confusion or difficulty
on my part.” The applicant alleged that if any of her subordinates voiced a lack of confidence in
her, it was likely because the CO was “always publicly criticizing and berating” her.
The applicant again denied having negative relationships with any other department head
or division chief. She also denied ordering others to provide needed information, instead of
“partnering” with them. She also stated, contrary to the comment that she was hesitant to “con-
duct critical liaison or provide timely input to counterparts on other ESG units,” that she had
exhausted every avenue she could think of in trying to communicate with the Operations person-
nel and carrier support staff, but “they were almost impossible to reach.” Moreover, as with the
strait transit brief, the Navy often provided information only to the CO, which he failed to pass
on timely to her.
Regarding the comment about “marginal initiative,” the applicant alleged that the com-
ments about her long hours of research and being overwhelmed with work contradict this char-
acterization of her initiative. She further stated that she worked exhausting hours and was never
counseled about failing to show initiative. She stated that the CO and XO “from the beginning
and without cause sought to direct [her] in the day-to-day operation of [her] Department,
demanding oversight on issues as low-level as the Watch Schedule.” They also directed her
tasking and gave her subordinates some major projects without advising her.
Regarding the comment that she was ineffective as the senior officer in the CIC, the
applicant stated that she “got the feeling that the CO wanted [her] to scream and rant at the CIC
personnel,” which she could not do in good conscience because their lack of training in the skills
needed in the CIC was not their fault. She could only ensure that there was a robust training pro-
gram, and she is credited with that in the SOER. In addition, she alleged that while her TAO
training taught her to use a computer to communicate online in a chat room with other TAOs, the
CO wanted her standing in the middle of the CIC, away from the computer, listening to all of the
radio communications from each warfare area.
Regarding the drill in which the helicopter passed into the air space of three different
Navy vessels, the applicant stated that she was training a new ADC, who was not yet qualified to
direct low visibility approaches, and the glitch in the radar, which she thought had been fixed,
recurred. The pilot complained directly to the CO that they had “almost killed” him, and both
she and the ADC were publicly berated. Moreover, she stated that as the TAO, she was not
responsible for direct oversight of the flight patterns, which is the responsibility of the ADC.
Regarding the Philippine Strait Transit, the applicant stated that they did not miss a track
leg. They had plotted all the track lines correctly on the proper chart, but the schedule changed
the night before the transit, and she did not realize that the Navy had added an extra waypoint to
move them farther from waters that were potentially too shallow for the aircraft carrier. Since
she was standing watch in the CIC during the transit, she could not see which chart the bridge
team was using. However, their use of the wrong chart simply meant that the hazardous water
appeared closer to them on the chart than it actually was, which posed no additional danger to the
cutter. Moreover, command intervention was not required. When the navigation and CIC teams
noticed the problem, they simply turned the ship and directed it on a new course.
Regarding the allegation that she had expressed confusion about her leadership role, the
applicant alleged that this comment concerned only an expression of frustration she made when
she learned that the XO had allowed the Deck Division, which was part of her department, to
spend her department’s money without her knowledge.
The applicant alleged that the only time she was hesitant and inarticulate under pressure
was when she was being intimidated by the CO. The applicant stated that during her six years as
an officer, she has “stood down belligerent fishermen as a Boarding Officer, kept [her] cool as a
Deck Watch Officer when the engines suddenly shut down during a dangerous harbor transit,
maneuvered a patrol boat around numerous hazards to shield a nuclear submarine from potential
threat and navigated across a hazardous breaking bar” that even the CO of the patrol boat
doubted he could do successfully. She always performed as required and was never accused of
being hesitant or inarticulate, but it “is hard to describe what happens to you … when you are
subjected for months to the belittling, demeaning comments of a Commanding Officer who
seems determined to prove to himself that you are not worthy of the position.”
The OSC stated that although she, herself, steered a helicopter into the airspace of other
ships during a drill, the applicant, as the TAO, took most of the blame. During that drill the radar
“was experiencing a recurring problem maintaining a solid return on the scope when the Helo
was in flight. This made it almost impossible to see where the Helo was during flights.”
Although an electrician’s mate tried to fix the problem, it was not fixed during the drill. Eventu-
ally, the pilots asked to navigate themselves, and she agreed. The next day, the CO publicly
dressed her down and replaced her as the Air Direction Controller (ADC) by a subordinate in
front of her entire division. Two weeks later, after the electrician changed the video card, they
The applicant noted that as a Command Duty Officer at her subsequent assignment, she
qualified for the position in an unprecedented short time and has received “nothing but high
marks and praise for [her] work there.” The applicant stated that she is “very introspective by
nature” and would not ask for the removal of the SOER if she had “any belief that the failures set
down … were true.” She is asking for its expungement because “it is inaccurate and prejudiced,
based on the arbitrary and capricious demands and expectations of my command.” In support of
her allegations, the applicant submitted four statements from her subordinates in the Operations
Department, which are summarized below:
Statement of the OSC of the Combat Information Center
A chief operations specialist (OSC) in the CIC on the cutter stated that she believes the
applicant was treated unfairly. The command climate aboard the cutter was “miserable. Senior
members were cursed at regularly by the CO in front of subordinates. Explosive tirades on the
Bridge and CIC occurred on a regular basis and there was always a feeling of walking on egg
shells. The CO seemed to be intensely angry at someone or some circumstance most of the time.
… The Executive Officer … exacerbated these situations by acting as a police detective, ques-
tioning someone he already determined to be guilty of dereliction of duty. The conversations in
the Chief’s mess concerning the oppressive leadership and fear driven command climate were
frequent amongst all the Chiefs with the exception of one,” who was a close friend of the CO and
would report everything said to him. The OSC stated that the applicant “communicated clearly
and professionally during stressful situations. The times when I witnessed her having trouble
communicating was when the CO was screaming and cursing at her. [She], as far as I could tell,
had a positive working relationship with all the Chiefs in the Mess. As a member of the Mess, I
never heard anyone saying they were having difficulties working with her.”
were able to complete the drill successfully. The OSC stated that she does not “see how [the
applicant’s] actions could have prevented what happened.”
Regarding the morning briefs, the OSC stated that the command’s expectations continu-
ally changed, and no matter how hard they tried, something was always wrong, either with the
presentation, or the format, or the information provided. Upon the applicant’s departure, the
OSC stated, three male officers were sent in temporary stints to fill the position of Operations
Officer for the rest of the deployment. The CO never dressed them down in the same manner he
had dressed down the applicant for similar mistakes.
Statement of the OSC of the Communications Division
The OSC who served as the lead petty officer in the Communications Division on the cut-
ter stated that, prior to their overseas deployment, she and the applicant “worked together to
ensure all known communications and security issues were resolved prior to deployment.” In the
summer of 2006, about one-third of the crew had transferred and been replaced. In addition,
three members in the CIC lost their security clearances due to debt issues. Therefore, “CIC and
Radio were both undermanned for this patrol.” However, the applicant “always displayed a
positive attitude and worked as a team player with Radio and CIC personnel. As a leader, she
always absorbed the brunt of the Captain’s angry displeasure when Radio or CIC did not live up
to his expectations. Unfortunately, she came into a command where minor problems in every
division were blown out of proportion and thus became major problems which affected morale.
This ultimately created a highly stressed environment throughout the entire ship, resulting in
many individuals, both enlisted and commissioned, retiring, deciding not to reenlist, or transfer-
ring with tainted memories after the patrol.”
Statement of the First Lieutenant
The First Lieutenant7 of the cutter, a chief warrant officer who reported directly to the
applicant, stated that 2006 was a hectic year because the cutter was undergoing a two-month yard
period and a six-week training exercise with the Navy before deploying to the Middle East in
September. Between the yard period and the six-week training with the Navy, a new CO report-
ed aboard. The new CO was
arrogant and abrasive … simply an abusive individual who thought nothing of the crew and their
welfare. Unfortunately for [the applicant], she became a lightning rod for his abuse. From my
perspective, [the CO] seemed very dismissive of her opinions and recommendation while taking
enjoyment, in the form of openly chastising and berating her, in any misstep she or one of her sub-
ordinates made or was perceived to have made. I felt that [the applicant] was a very competent
officer who was not given any chance to succeed. I found her to be a hardworking and level-
headed officer who always had time to help anyone who needed assistance. She never once com-
plained about the abuse she was subject to, and she outwardly supported the command in all their
decisions. I do not know why [the CO] singled her out, but I feel it could possibly have been
because of her sex as the three other Operations Officers that followed were male and they did not
nearly put in the effort that she did, yet they were openly praised by [the CO] and were rewarded
7 On a vessel, the “First Lieutenant” is a position—the head of the deck department or division—and does not
necessarily hold the rank of lieutenant. UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, COMDTINST M5000.3B, UNITED
STATES COAST GUARD REGULATIONS, Chap. 6-7-1 (1992).
upon their departure. ... It should be noted that the [CO] was recently relieved as Commanding
Officer … and found guilty at Admiral’s Mast for assaulting an enlisted member. This speaks vol-
umes to what the crew, and specifically [the applicant] had to endure onboard [the cutter] … [H]er
career should not hinge on one obviously slanted and grossly unfair [SOER].”
Statement of an OS2 in the CIC
An OS2 stated that during an air defense drill in August 2006, the CIC was manned by
between seven and nine OS watchstanders; herself as the acting CIC watch supervisor; the appli-
cant as the TAO; and the new CO. During the drill, “there was a lot of confusion within CIC
over something that had been missed by the watchstander on air radar.” While the OS2 was try-
ing to help the watchstander and to let the Navy vessels know what was happening, she heard the
CO raise his voice at someone. Then the CO yelled at her to contact another ship, but
he was trying to get me to do it on the wrong frequency. I did not know how to correct him so I
just stood there for a second trying to get to the other radio. He threw his pencil at me and it flew
by and hit the TV screen. I do not remember what he said or what was going on at that point,
except I just picked up the radio he wanted me to and I tried to call out to the other vessel. …
[After the other vessel failed to respond] I could hear the Captain yelling at [the applicant] about
the drill going poorly, and I looked over and saw him grab [her] by the arm and pull her to the
middle of the room. He was yelling at her but I was trying not to pay attention … . After the
debrief, I walked over to [the applicant] who looked very upset … .
VIEWS OF THE COAST GUARD
On November 18, 2008, the Judge Advocate General (JAG) of the Coast Guard submitted
an advisory opinion in which he recommended granting partial relief by changing the start date of
the evaluation period for the SOER to the date she actually reported to the cutter, which was
March 30, 2006.
The JAG argued that the applicant’s “allegations and lack of persuasive evidence has not
established fact to overcome the presumption that her rating chain acted correctly, lawfully, and
in good faith in evaluating and documenting [her] deficient performance.” The JAG stated that
the SOER was submitted in accordance with Article 10.A.3.c.1.a. of the Personnel Manual and
documents her CO’s decision to remove her as the Operations Officer. The JAG stated that the
OER “accurately reflects the applicant’s serious performance deficiencies” as observed by the
XO and CO of the cutter. The JAG also argued that the fact that the applicant has performed
well in other assignments is not probative of the validity of the SOER. Citing Grieg v. United
States, 640 F.2d 1261, 1269 (Ct. Cl. 1981), the JAG argued that it “is a well settled point of law
that the mere fact that [an applicant] had better ratings either before or after the disputed OER is
of no legal moment or probative value as to [the] rating period covered by [the] disputed report.”
Therefore, the JAG recommended that the Board correct only the reporting date on the SOER.
APPLICANT’S RESPONSE TO THE COAST GUARD’S VIEWS
On January 2, 2009, the applicant responded to the views of the Coast Guard. She stated
that the SOER “does not accurately portray [her] performance while onboard” the cutter. She
stated that she has always “striven to be a model of behavior and performance,” and her other
OERs reflect this effort. She argued that while her other OERs are not “proof” that the SOER is
erroneous and unfair, they do not reveal “any weaknesses … that would show a correlation to
what was written” in the SOER.
The applicant argued that she has refuted the comments in the SOER line by line, and
produced statements from five other officers who support her contention that she was treated
unfairly. She alleged that the comment that she had “marginal initiative” contradicts the com-
ment that she was an intelligent officer who “spent long hours researching issues.” The applicant
stated that she will not speculate as to why her command treated her so unfairly, but “it is obvi-
ous from the comments and marks in the OER that they exaggerated and twisted facts in order to
fill it with “justification.”
APPLICABLE REGULATIONS
Under Article 10.A.3.a. of the Personnel Manual in effect in 2006,8 lieutenants usually
receive a regular, annual OER at the end of May each year. However, Article 10.A.3.c.1.a.,
states that a special OER (SOER) “may be completed to document performance notably different
from the previous reporting period, if deferring the report of performance until the next regular
report would preclude documentation to support adequate personnel management decisions, such
as selection or reassignment.”
Article 10.A.4.c.4. of the Personnel Manual provides the following instructions for Super-
visors completing their section of an OER or SOER (similar instructions are provided for
Reporting Officers in Article 10.A.4.c.7.):
b. For each evaluation area, the Supervisor shall review the Reported-on Officer’s performance
and qualities observed and noted during the reporting period. Then, for each of the performance
dimensions, the Supervisor shall carefully read the standards and compare the Reported-on Offi-
cer’s performance to the level of performance described by the standards. The Supervisor shall
take care to compare the officer’s performance and qualities against the standards—not to other
officers and not to the same officer in a previous reporting period. After determining which block
best describes the Reported-on Officer’s performance and qualities during the marking period, the
Supervisor fills in the appropriate circle on the form in ink.
c. Where the Supervisor has insufficient information to provide a mark or if observations are
believed inadequate to render a judgment, the “not observed” circle shall be used. The reason for
the “not observed” must be briefly stated in the “comments” blocks or Section 2.
d. In the “comments” block following each evaluation area, the Supervisor shall include comments
citing specific aspects of the Reported-on Officer’s performance and behavior for each mark that
deviates from a four. The Supervisor shall draw on his or her observations, those of any secondary
Supervisors, and other information accumulated during the reporting period.
e. Comments should amplify and be consistent with the numerical evaluations. They should iden-
tify specific strengths and weaknesses in performance. Comments must be sufficiently specific to
paint a succinct picture of the officer’s performance and qualities which compares reasonably with
the picture defined by the standards marked on the performance dimensions in the evaluation area.
Mere repetition or paraphrasing of the standards is not sufficient narrative justification for below
or above standard marks.
● ● ●
8 See PERSMAN, footnote 1, above.
g. A mark of four represents the expected standard of performance. Additional specific perform-
ance observations must be included when an officer has been assigned a mark of five or six to
show how they exceeded this high level of performance. Those assigned the superlative mark of
seven should have specific comments demonstrating how they exceeded the six standard block.
Article 10.A.4.c.8.a. states that on the comparison scale in an OER, a Reporting Officer
“shall fill in the circle that most closely reflects the Reporting Officer’s ranking of the Reported-
on Officer relative to all other officers of the same grade the Reporting Officer has known.”
Under Article 10.A.4.h.1., any OER that documents “adverse performance or conduct that
results in the removal of a member from his or her primary duty or position” is a “derogatory”
OER and the reported-on officer may respond to the marks and comments in an addendum before
the OER is passed to the Reviewer. Article 10.A.4.h.2. allows the Supervisor and Reporting
Officer to add comments to the addendum before forwarding it to the Reviewer, who ensures that
the information in the OER is consistent and that the derogatory information is substantiated.
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
The Board makes the following findings and conclusions based on the applicant's military
record and submissions, the Coast Guard's submissions, and applicable law:
The Board has jurisdiction concerning this matter pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 1552.
The application was timely.
1.
2.
3.
The applicant requested an oral hearing before the Board. The Chair, acting
pursuant to 33 C.F.R. § 52.51, denied the request and recommended disposition of the case with-
out a hearing. The Board concurs in that recommendation.9
The applicant alleged that the SOER she received following her removal as the
Operations Officer of the XXXX is inaccurate and a product of gender bias on the part of an
abusive CO. Article 10.A.1.b.1. of the Personnel Manual provides that “[c]ommanding officers
must ensure accurate, fair, and objective evaluations are provided to all officers under their com-
mand.” To establish that an OER is inaccurate or unjust, an applicant must prove that it was
adversely affected by (a) a “misstatement of significant hard fact,” (b) a “clear and prejudicial
violation of a statute or regulation,” or (c) factors that “had no business being in the rating proc-
ess.”10 The Board begins its analysis in every case by presuming that a disputed OER is correct
as it appears in the record, and the applicant bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of
the evidence that it is erroneous or unjust.11 Absent evidence to the contrary, the Board presumes
that the applicant’s Supervisor and Reporting Officer (the XO and CO) prepared the SOER “cor-
rectly, lawfully, and in good faith.”12
9 See Steen v. United States, No. 436-74, 1977 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 585, at *21 (Dec. 7, 1977) (holding that “whether
to grant such a hearing is a decision entirely within the discretion of the Board”).
10 Germano v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 1446, 1460 (1992); see also Hary v. United States, 618 F.2d 704, 708 (Ct.
Cl. 1980); CGBCMR Dkt. No. 86-96.
11 33 C.F.R. § 52.24(b).
12 Arens v. United States, 969 F.2d 1034, 1037 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Sanders v. United States, 594 F.2d 804, 813 (Ct. Cl.
1979).
4.
Given the statements of the applicant’s four subordinates—the OSCs of the CIC
and the Communications Division, the First Lieutenant (head of the Deck Division), and an OS2
in the CIC—the applicant has proved that her CO had an anger-management problem, which cre-
ated a stressful command climate as he publicly and privately chastised personnel he perceived to
have made significant mistakes, especially her. Although the applicant speculated that the CO
may have been prejudiced against her because of her gender, there is little evidence to support
this allegation. The Coast Guard prohibits sexual harassment of and discrimination against mili-
tary members,13 but neither the applicant nor her subordinates claim that the CO chastised only
her or only female crewmembers. The OSC of the CIC and the First Lieutenant noted that the
CO did not publicly chastise subsequent male Operations Officers for “similar mistakes” to those
of the applicant, but there is insufficient information about the nature and frequency of the “simi-
lar mistakes” or the overall leadership and performance of these subsequent Operations Officers
for the Board to conclude that the CO’s treatment and evaluation of the applicant were prejudiced
by her gender.
The applicant appears to be arguing, at least in part, that she was subject to a “hos-
tile work environment,”14 which was so severe that it interfered with her ability to perform her
duties. However, she has not shown that the CO’s angry language and physical conduct toward
her were in any way sexual or prejudiced, which is a required element of a “hostile work environ-
ment.”15 However, Chapter 3.A.1.a. of the Equal Opportunity Manual states that every member
of the Coast Guard deserves to be treated with honor, dignity and respect. It is theoretically
possible that a CO could treat a junior officer so horribly that the junior officer could not reason-
ably be expected to perform her duties well even if the CO’s abuse was not based on gender, race,
or religion. An SOER resulting from such treatment might constitute an “injustice” in the offi-
cer’s record and so be removed by the Board.16 Although the applicant has not shown that her
CO criticized her because of her gender, the legal criteria for a “hostile work environment” are
instructive as to the type of evidence needed to prove that a command climate is so abusive that a
competent officer cannot reasonably be expected to perform her duties well. Occasional hostile
5.
13 UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, COMDTINST M5350.4B, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY MANUAL, Chap. 3.A.3.a.
(Nov. 1, 2005) (hereinafter “EOM”) (“Although the statutory prohibitions against discrimination in civilian
employment do not apply to members of the uniformed services, it is the Coast Guard’s policy to provide its military
members equal opportunity during their military service and access to the rights, responsibilities, and privileges of
such service, regardless of: Race; Color; Religion; Sex; National origin; or Participation in EO related activities.”).
14 Military officers are not protected from “hostile work environments” under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16; see Roper v. Dep’t of the Army, 832 F.2d 247, 248 (2nd Cir. 1987) (finding that “the
Feres doctrine prevents members of the military from challenging military decisions through actions brought under
Title VII”). However, “it is the Coast Guard’s policy to apply the same protections [in Title VII] to the military
workforce.” EOM, Chap. 3.A.5.b. The Coast Guard prohibits “sexual harassment,” which it defines to include
“unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature
when … such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work performance or
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.” Id. at Chap. 3.A.5.c. “To meet the definition of
a hostile environment, the harassment must be so severe and pervasive that a reasonable person would view the
environment as hostile, offensive, or abusive.” Id. at Chap. 3.A.5.d.
15 EOM, Chap. 3.A.5.c.
16 The Board may remove injustices from any Coast Guard military record. 10 U.S.C. § 1552(a). For the purposes
of the BCMRs, “‘[i]njustice’, when not also ‘error’, is treatment by the military authorities, that shocks the sense of
justice, but is not technically illegal.” Reale v. United States, 208 Ct. Cl. 1010, 1011 (1976).
6.
or humiliating words and actions are insufficient.17 Factors that courts consider aside from bias
include the frequency of the conduct; the severity of the conduct; whether the conduct is physi-
cally threatening or humiliating or merely offensive; and whether the conduct unreasonably inter-
fered with an employee’s work performance.18 A “hostile work environment” in the civilian
sector exists “[w]hen the workplace is permeated with ‘discriminatory intimidation ridicule, and
insult’ that is ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment
and create an abusive working environment.’”19 However, in assessing such matters, the Board
must also take into account the distinctly different military, shipboard, combat-training environ-
ment on the XXXX, as well as the potential dangers incurred by poor performance.
The evidence of the CO’s alleged inappropriate behavior toward the applicant is
incidental: When there was confusion in the CIC during one air defense drill, the CO grabbed
her arm, pulled her into the center of the CIC, and stated that her lack of effort would get them all
killed in the Persian Gulf; when frustrated during a brief one morning, he grabbed a pencil out of
her hand and threw it down so hard that it bounced off her water bottle and hit her; and he once
asked her during a discussion of their transit time whether she was lazy or stupid. The First Lieu-
tenant wrote that she became a “lightning rod for [the CO’s] abuse” and described her as a “very
competent officer who was not given any chance to succeed,” but he was head of the Deck Divi-
sion and apparently did not observe her performance in the CIC during the drills. The applicant
alleged that she was humiliated by the CO and that he undermined her leadership, but there is
insufficient evidence concerning the frequency of the CO’s public criticisms, the nature of his
language, and the problems and potential dangers to which he was reacting for the Board to con-
clude that the command climate was arbitrarily hostile and abusive, as the applicant alleged, or
that she could not reasonably have been expected to perform her job to the CO’s satisfaction.
The Board in no way excuses the CO for not expressing his anger more appropriately. However,
the evidence in the record is insufficient to prove that the attitude and actions of the CO were
arbitrarily abusive or warrant expungement of the SOER.
7.
8.
The applicant has alleged that many of the examples of her performance cited in
the SOER are inaccurate, exaggerated. or lacking context and inaccurately blame her for situa-
tions not in her control. For example, she stated that as the TAO, she should not have been
blamed for sending the helicopter into the air space of three Navy vessels during an exercise, as
directing the helicopter was the responsibility of the ADC, and that as the TAO she was supposed
to be sitting at a computer observing rather than listening to radio communications and directly
overseeing the ADC. However, she also admitted that the subordinate she had serving as the
ADC during the drill was still unqualified and in training. She alleged that her relationships with
the other department heads were not negative, as indicated in the SOER, but she did not submit
any statements from fellow department heads to support her allegation.
The applicant alleged that she was horribly overworked; that most of her depart-
ment’s problems resulted from broken or inadequate equipment, poor communications with the
Navy, and a severe lack of trained personnel in the CIC and other Operations divisions; and that
17 See Overton, 373 F.3d at 99 (concurring) (Pooler, J., concurring) (noting that a handful of racist comments spread
out over several years was insufficient to create a “hostile work environment”).
18 Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
19 Id. (citations omitted).
her CO and XO refused to acknowledge her department’s limitations because of these issues.
She has submitted statements from three OS subordinates supporting her view of what caused the
cutter’s helicopter to enter the air space of three Navy vessels during a drill and how the CO
reacted, of the command’s continual dissatisfaction with the morning briefs, and of unexpected
undermanning in the CIC. The evidence of these subordinates, however, is inadequate to prove
that any of the specific examples of her performance cited on the SOER are inaccurate or unjust
or that the numerical marks are too low. While the applicant described her circumstances aboard
the XXXX in way that makes it appear that it would have been impossible for her to succeed or
to please the CO, she has not supported her claims in this regard with sufficient evidence. In
fact, her subordinates’ statements indicate that the CO was satisfied by the performance of subse-
quent Operations Officers during the deployment. While the work schedule she describes
appears very demanding, the Board cannot determine, by the evidence presented, that another
lieutenant could not have performed substantially better and satisfied the CO and XO during the
evaluation period. Absent corroborative statements from the XO, other department heads, or the
Operations Officers who followed her on the XXXX, the Board is not persuaded that the
numerical marks and comments in the SOER are inaccurate or unjust.
The applicant made numerous allegations with respect to the actions and attitudes
of her CO and XO. Those allegations not specifically addressed above are considered to be not
dispositive of the case.20
The SOER was prepared upon the applicant’s removal from her primary duty in
accordance with Articles 10.A.3.c.1.a. and 10.A.4.h.1.c. of the Personnel Manual. The applicant
has not proved that she was subject to gender discrimination or to a command climate that was so
arbitrarily hostile that she could not reasonably have been expected to perform her duties in
accordance with the command’s expectations. She has submitted ample evidence that the CO
expressed anger inappropriately, but she has not proved that she did not in fact make many sig-
nificant mistakes that warranted the criticisms in the SOER. Nor has she proved that the CO’s
actions and attitude resulted from her female gender. The applicant has submitted insufficient
evidence to overcome the presumption of regularity accorded the marks and comments in the
SOER or to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it was adversely affected by a “mis-
statement of significant hard fact,” a “clear and prejudicial violation of a statute or regulation,” or
factors that “had no business being in the rating process.”21
Both the applicant and the JAG agree that she reported to the XXXX on March
31, 2006, and that the report date shown in block 1.e. of the SOER is erroneous because it
reflects the date of her orders, March 6, 2006, rather than the date she reported to the cutter.
Therefore, the report date on the SOER should be corrected.
Therefore, the applicant’s request should be granted in part in that the report date
shown in block 1.e. of the SOER should be corrected to show that she reported on March 31,
2006. All other requested relief should be denied, except that the Board finds that the Chair
11.
9.
10.
12.
20 See Frizelle v. Slater, 111 F.3d 172, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting that the Board need not address arguments that
“could [not] affect the Board’s ultimate disposition”).
21 Germano, 26 Cl. Ct. at 1460; see also Hary, 618 F.2d at 708.
should grant further consideration if, within 180 days of this decision, the applicant requests it
and submits new evidence that the Chair believes could result in a different outcome of the case.
ORDER
The application of LT xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, USCG, for correction of her
The “Date Reported” in block 1.e. of her OER for the period February 1, 2006, to October
military record is granted in part as follows:
15, 2006, shall be corrected to March 31, 2006.
In addition, she may request further consideration of the remainder of the requested relief
if, within 180 days of the date of this decision, she submits new evidence that the Chair believes
could result in a different outcome of the case.
Janice Williams-Jones
Paul B. Oman
Thomas H. Van Horn
CG | BCMR | OER and or Failure of Selection | 2004-007
This final decision, dated July 29, 2004, is signed by the three duly appointed APPLICANT’S REQUEST The applicant asked the Board to correct his military record by removing a very poor special officer evaluation report (SOER) that he received for his service as the Executive Officer (XO) of the cutter XXX from June 1 until October 8, 2001, when, he alleged, he was relieved of duty because of a personality conflict with his commanding officer (CO); by removing the regular OER that he received...
CG | BCMR | OER and or Failure of Selection | 1999-142
He alleged that none of his supervisors or the executive officer (XO) of the Xxxx, who was his reporting officer and who wrote the comments, “had ever mentioned any watchstanding issues during the reporting period.” Upon receiving the disputed OER, the applicant alleged, he asked his supervisor about the negative comments. Naval Flight School and that his performance was “well above average.” However, as a student, his performance was not evaluated in his OERs but marked “not...
CG | BCMR | OER and or Failure of Selection | 2012-109
The applicant alleged that he should have received a mark of 6 for “Directing Others.” He alleged that the supporting comments entered by the XO meet the written standard for a mark of 6. Regarding the disputed OER, the XO said that the CO did influence him to lower the applicant’s marks “to some degree.” She did not specify exactly what marks the XO should assign but told him that the AOps was responsible for [the] perceived performance shortfalls of those in his department. The XO stated...
CG | BCMR | OER and or Failure of Selection | 2011-082
d. I do not believe [the applicant’s] statement that he did not know that the quote book was on the bridge during the marking period. There was one book. Rating chain officials must base their marks and comments in an OER only on a reported-on officer’s performance during the reporting period, and they may not comment on “performance or conduct which occurred outside the reporting period.” 9 Therefore, if the applicant was unaware that the quote book had been returned to the bridge during...
CG | BCMR | OER and or Failure of Selection | 2011-126
The applicant alleged that his CO was the subject of a command climate investigation he helped to instigate and that as a result of the investigation, she was relieved of command. It shows that the XO of the patrol boat, who assigned the first 13 performance marks as the appli- cant’s supervisor, was also a LTJG. Declaration of the XO as the Applicant’s Supervisor The XO, who is currently the CO of another patrol boat, stated that the marks assigned to the applicant in the disputed OER...
CG | BCMR | OER and or Failure of Selection | 2011-035
The PRRB found that prior to the reporting period for the OER, several officers who served on the bridge as Officer of the Day discussed the offensive content of the quote book, gave the quote book to the AOO “for disposition,” and “rightfully assumed the issue was resolved.” The PRRB found that the CO, who served as the Reviewer for LTJG X’s OER, found the quote book in April 2009 and “wrongfully based her view of the applicant’s performance on the date she personally discovered the quote...
CG | BCMR | OER and or Failure of Selection | 2006-104
On his OERs, his commanding officer strongly recommended him for promotion and noted the applicant’s desire to serve as the XO or CO of a cutter. On his first OER in this position, the applicant received all marks of 4 and 5 and his CO’s recommendation for promotion. On his OERs for this work, he has received high marks of 5, 6, and 7 in the performance categories, marks of 5 on the comparison scale, and his reporting officers’ strong recommendations for command afloat and promotion to commander.
CG | BCMR | OER and or Failure of Selection | 2008-066
On March 19, xxxx, the RO forwarded to the District Commander the report of the investigation into the grounding of the XXXX on December 2, xxxx. In light of CDR L’s assessment of the RO’s behavior on March 12, xxxx, when the applicant exercised her right to remain silent and consult an attorney; the EPO’s statement about receiving an email on March 12, xxxx, inviting the crew to attend a public mast the fol- lowing Friday; and the Family Advocacy Specialist’s description of the RO’s...
CG | BCMR | OER and or Failure of Selection | 2007-125
The applicant denied that she had consensual sexual relations on board a Coast Guard unit with an enlisted member. Commanding Officer’s (CO) Comments on the NJP Appeal On May 12, 2004, the applicant’s commanding officer (CO) recommended that the Commander, Eighth Coast Guard District (Commander) deny the applicant’s appeal. That based on the statements given by [the applicant] and statements contained in the CGIS report which were not challenged during the mast proceeding, I find that the...
CG | BCMR | OER and or Failure of Selection | 1998-038
The applicant alleged that six marks of 33 on the first disputed OER are inaccu- rate and inconsistent with the comments. Affidavit of the OO, the Operations Officer of the Xxxx The OO stated that the marks he gave the applicant in the first disputed OER were based on the applicant’s performance. The instructions state the following: (d) In the “Comments” sections following each evaluation area, the Re- porting Officer [or Supervisor] shall include comments citing specific aspects of the...